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Abstract
Although teaching Bayes’ theorem is popular, the standard approach—targeting posterior
distributions of parameters—may be improved. We advocate teaching Bayes theorem in a
ratio form where the posterior beliefs relative to the prior beliefs equals the conditional
probability of data relative to the marginal probability of data. This form leads to an
interpretation that the strength of evidence is relative predictive accuracy. With this
approach, students are encouraged to view Bayes’ theorem as an updating mechanism, to
obtain a deeper appreciation of the role of the prior and of marginal data, and to view
estimation and model comparison from a unified perspective.
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Teaching Bayes’ Theorem: Strength of Evidence As Predictive
Accuracy
As Bayesian statistics increases in popularity, it is essential to have effective ways of
teaching Bayes’ theorem. In this note, we present our approach that we find suitable for
advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students in an introduction to
mathematical statistics or in a Bayesian analysis topics course. There has been much work
on best methods for teaching conditional probability in introduction courses, especially
with use of frequencies and intersections(Albert, 1997; Berry, 1997; Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995, e.g.,). Bayes theorem, however, should be treated separately as Bayesians
use Bayes theorem not only to update probabilities but as a basis of statistical inference.
We assume for the following development that students are familiar with concepts of
conditional, joint, and marginal probabilities and probability distributions. Our focus is
on the implications of Bayes theorem as a measure of statistical evidence.
The Proportional Form of Bayes Theorem
In the vast majority of texts, Bayes’ theorem is stated as,
pi(θ|Y ) =
p(Y |θ)pi(θ)
p(Y )
. (1)
where pi(θ|Y ) and pi(θ) denote the posterior and prior distributions of the (possibly
multivariate) parameter θ, and p(Y |θ) and p(Y ) are the likelihood and marginal likelihood
of the (possibly multivariate) data Y . For a continuous parameter, the marginal likelihood
is
p(Y ) =
Z
Θ
p(Y |θ)pi(θ) dθ,
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where Θ represents the parameter space of θ. For discrete parameters, the integration is
replaced by summation.
After providing (1), many texts introduce a proportional form of Bayes theorem:
pi(θ|Y ) ∝ l(θ;Y )× pi(θ), (2)
where the likelihood l is the probability of the observed data Y – that is, p(Y |θ) – as a
function of θ. This form has a handy mnemonic—“the posterior is proportional to the
likelihood times the prior.” The proportional form may be illustrated with graphs of
priors, likelihoods, and posteriors such as those in Figure 1. Here it may be seen that the
posterior reflects the pull of both the likelihood and prior, and that there is no posterior
mass where there is no prior mass.
When the proportional form is used, instructors will often (correctly) state that
because p(Y ) is not a function of θ, it is simply a normalizing constant with an unknown
value. Commonly-used posterior sampling methods require only knowledge of the
posterior distribution up to a constant of proportionality; thus, p(Y ) may be ignored.
Because many courses on Bayesian statistics make heavy use of such sampling methods
(e.g., Markov chain Monte Carlo), it is perhaps not surprising that the proportional
version is the one predominantly stressed in texts including Gelman, Carlin, Stern, &
Rubin (2004), Jackman (2009), and Kruschke (2012).
We find, however, that when the proportional version is stressed, our students miss
out on critical Bayesian elements. First, they do not develop an intuition about p(Y ), the
marginal probability of data. This marginal is a uniquely Bayesian concept and intuition
about it is critical for understanding Bayesian model comparison and Bayesian model
criticism. Second, they tend to stress the output, the posterior, rather than the process of
updating. Third, students take a dim view of priors. According to them, priors are
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subjective while likelihoods are objective. Consequently, students value flat priors.
Fourth, because p(Y ) is unused in estimation and is critical in model comparison, students
see estimation and model comparison as separate rather than unified.
A Ratio Form Of Bayes Theorem
To address these difficulties and to promote a deeper understanding of Bayes’
theorem, we follow a line of argument perhaps first presented by Carnap (1962). We
augment the proportional form with the following ratio form:
pi(θ|Y )
pi(θ)
=
p(Y |θ)
p(Y )
. (3)
Though (3) is simply a rearrangement of (1), this form makes clear some important
implications of Bayes’ theorem. We teach it as follows:
The left-hand-side of (3) concerns probabilities over parameters, or beliefs. The
ratio describes how beliefs about values of θ are updated in light of data. Figure 2A shows
an example where θ is the parameter in a binomial model. The datum in this case is 7
heads in 10 flips. The prior is a beta (2.5,1) that slightly favors larger values of θ; the
posterior is beta (9.5,4). Two example points are provided, θ = .75 and θ = .3. For
θ = .75, the posterior and prior density is 3.24 and 1.62, respectively, and the updating
factor is 2.0. Here the data have increased the plausibility of the point. For θ = .30, the
updating factor is .07, indicating the data have decreased the plausibility of the point
markedly. The left-hand-side of (3), the updating factor, is shown as a function of θ in
Figure 2B. As side exercises we ask students to find intervals where the data have
decreased the plausibility by more than 10-1. We also ask students to explore how the
prior affects the updating by plotting the left-hand side of (3) for different priors. This
exercise can be extended to improper priors, say a beta (0,0) prior, where the updating
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factor must be infinitely large. Such a peculiar state is not obvious in the proportional
form, and motivates the need for caution when using improper priors.
We follow Jeffreys (1961) call this updating factor the strength of the evidence from
the data about θ. Evidence from data is how the data license an update of beliefs.
The right hand side concerns of (3) concerns probabilities of observed data, and the
term p(Y ) is particularly new. Students sometimes have the mistaken intution this term
should have value 1.0 to reflect that the observed data were observed. To combat this
intuition, we find it helpful to refer introduce probability mass functions over outcomes as
predictions. We start with p(Y |θ), the numerator, as it is most accessible. If θ is specified,
say at θ = .75, then p(Y |θ) provides a probability distribution over outcomes (Figure 2C).
Here, we can ask how well the observed datum, 7 heads in 10 flips, was predicted (see the
starred point). We can compare this prediction to predictions from other models, and
Figure 2D shows the case for θ = .30. We also can introduce other prediction patters at
this point, and show Figure 2E as an example. We point out to students that these
whatever these patterns are, they must sum to 1.0. The implication is that if the
prediction for one outcome is increased, the prediction for the others must be decreased to
maintain the sum. With these three figures, students can compute ratios of how much
better one pattern predicted the observe datum than another. We stress understanding
these plots as predictions before seeing data, and that the comparison at the observed
data is a measure of relative predictive accuracy.
Once students have been introduced to the concept of comparing predictions, we
switch over to the concept of conditional and marginal predictions. Figures 2C and 2D are
conditional predictions, conditional on specific values of θ. Figure 2E is marginal over all
these predictions. Here we introduce the denominator, p(Y ), and its computation through
the Law of Total Probability, namely, P (Y ) =
R
θ P (Y |θ)pi(θ) dθ. The term p(Y ) is termed
the marginal prediction of the data (when weighted by the prior pi(θ)). The terms p(Y |θ)
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and p(Y ) are plotted as a function of θ in Figure 2F and labeled “conditional” and
”marginal,” respectively. The right-hand side of (3), the ratio, is shown in Figure 2G. We
term this ratio the gain in predictive accuracy for θ.
Bayes rule states the equality of the left and right sides of (3), which can be seen by
noting the equality of Figures 2B and 2G. The updating factor for a value of θ, the
strength of evidence from the data, is how well the data are predicted when conditioned
on this value relative to the marginal prediction. In words, we say that “strength of
evidence for a parameter value is precisely the relative gain in predictive accuracy when
conditioning on it” (see also Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 2016). We may even use the
short-hand mnemonic, “strength of evidence is relative predictive accuracy.” We find that
allowing students to make this connection between evidence and prediction provides them
with a deeper insight into Bayes theorem than afforded by the proportional form.
Unified Estimation and Model Comparison
To unify estimation and model comparison, we find it useful to introduce the
concept of relative strength of evidence for competing parameter values. As an exercise we
ask students to compare the relative evidence for two values θ0 and θ1:
pi(θ1|Y )
pi(θ1)
pi(θ0|Y )
pi(θ0)
=
p(Y |θ1)
f(Y )
p(Y |θ0)
f(Y )
=
p(Y |θ1)
p(Y |θ0)
.
Here the relative strength of evidence is the ratio of probabilities of data, or gain in
predictive accuracy. This development is an example of model comparison. We are
comparing one model with a specific point value of θ1 vs. another model with a specific
point value of θ2. This example may be leveraged to introduce model comparison more
generally. In general, the relative strength of evidence is the Bayes factor, and the above
example shows the Bayes factor for these two constrained models.
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One advantage of the ratio form is that it seamlessly unifies parameter estimation
and model comparison. The inclusion of p(Y ) in the RHS of (3) indicates that even
parameter estimation yields only relative evidence. All specific θ values can be thought of
as restrictions on a general model with a prior across all θ. Each of these restrictions is
being implicitly compared to the model in which they are nested, whose likelihood is p(Y ).
To show students the unification, we let MA be our previous model on θ, the
probability of heads on a flip of a certain coin, defined by
Y | θ ∼ Binomial(θ,N),
θ ∼ Uniform(0, 1).
We integrate out θ to obtain Pr(Y ) = .0909 when Y = 7 for 10 flips. In fact,
Pr(Y ) = .0909 = 1/11 for all values of Y for this uniform prior. Figure 3A shows the
probability of data, the predictions, for all the outcomes of the ten-flip experiment.
Suppose we wish to compare this general model to a fair-coin model, denoted MB.
The fair-coin model is
Y ∼ Binomial(.5, N).
The predictions of the model are given by
(N
Y
)
(.5)10 and shown in Figure 3B.
The strength of evidence for each model is given respectively by
pi(MA|Y )
pi(MA)
=
p(Y |MA)
p(Y )
and
pi(MB|Y )
pi(MB)
=
p(Y |MB)
p(Y )
.
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The marginal density of data now is marginal over all considered models. Let M be
the class of I models indexed M1,M2, . . . ,MI . Then,
p(Y ) =
X
i
p(Y |Mi)pi(Mi).
The example helps students understand that the probability (or density) of data can
be expressed three ways: conditional on a particular model and parameter value;
conditional on a particular model but marginal across all parameters in the space for that
model, or marginal across several models. For example, the probability of 4 heads may be
conditional on a specific value of θ, say θ = .5 in the general model, and this probability is
found from a simple binomial calculation (.205). If also may conditional on the general
model but marginalized across all parameters. This calculation involves an integral across
simple binomial calculations, and the value is .0909. Finally, the probability can be
marginalized across uncertainty in whether the appropriate model is the fair one or the
general, the appropriate calculation is the weighted average of .0909 and .205, where the
weights reflect pi(Mi).
The usefulness of relative strength of evidence for models is now a straightforward
extension of the previous development. The relative strength of evidence, the Bayes
factor, is the relative predictive probabilities (densities):
pi(MA|Y )
pi(MA)
pi(MB |Y )
pi(MB)
= BFAB =
p(Y |MA)
p(Y |MB)
. (4)
The ratio of these predictions, the Bayes factors, is shown Figure 3C. Had we observed a
low number of heads, say Y = 2, we could note that the observation is better predicted
under model MA (with probability .0909) than under model MB (with probability .044).
The ratio is 2-to-1 in favor of the general model. Conversely, had we observed a moderate
number, say Y = 5, then the observation is better predicted by the fair-coin model, model
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MB than by the more general model MA. The ratio here is 2.7-to-1 in favor of the
fair-coin hypothesis.
The definition of p(Y |θ)/p(Y ) as predictive accuracy allows students to easily see
one of the oft-touted benefits of Bayes factors: they automatically reward parsimonious
models (e.g., Jefferys & Berger, 1991). More parsimonious models are ones that can make
specific predictions. The laws of probability require that a model with diffuse data
predictions will offer a low probability (or density) for any observed data set; hence, it will
be harder to obtain high amounts of evidence for a less parsimonious model unless the
more parsimonious model predicts the data even less accurately.
Conclusion
In summary, we find three main advantages to teaching the ratio form of Bayes’
theorem. First, students tend to see Bayes’ theorem as a way of updating beliefs. This
leads to a focus on the updating itself as much as on the resultant posterior. With such a
focus, it is easier to show students how prior specification affects updating, the role of the
prior in model specification, and the difficulties with improper priors. Second, students
learn to reason about the strength of statistical evidence, which may not be a concept
they have encountered except informally. Expressing strength of evidence as the degree to
which a set of propositions can accurately predict data is particularly intuitive. Finally,
students can unite estimation and model comparison as both are seen to flow from the
very same form. Students’ decision to use model comparison versus parameter estimation
can be driven by the question at hand, and not by blanket recommendations to avoid one
or the other.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. The relationship between the prior, likelihood, and posterior. The relationship is
based on proportionality, and values on the y-axis need not be included.
Figure 2. Updating with Bayes’ theorem. A. Prior and posterior distributions for 7 heads
in 10 flips. B. The left-hand side of (3), which is the updating factor and may be defined
as the strength of evidence from the data for values of θ C-D. Probability of outcomes for
θ = .75 and θ = .30, respectively. The starred point is the observed value of 7 heads in 10
flips. We find that students best understand these as “predictions” about where data
should be observed. E. Marginal probability of outcomes with marginalization across θ
with respect to the prior. These may be called the marginal predictions. F. P (Y |θ) and
P (Y ) as a function of θ for 7 heads in 10 flips. G. The ratio P (Y |θ)/P (Y ), or the gain in
predictive accuracy for values of θ. Bayes rule is a statement of the equality of plots B
and G.
Figure 3. A, B: The probability of outcomes under the general model, MA and under the
fair-coin model, MB, respectively. C: The ratio of these probabilities is the Bayes factor
between the models.
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